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 Executive Summary 
 
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) has emerged on the European political agenda. It is an 
idea whose time has come. Both the member states and the institutions of the European Union 
(EU) are presently investing in programmes for ‘better regulation’ and ‘good regulatory 
governance’. RIA is the cornerstone of these programmes. This paper explains how RIA is being 
diffused in Europe. Is the introduction of RIA in Europe simply the diffusion of an idea, the 
content of which remains very different in the various national contexts? Or, alternatively, has 
the diffusion of ideas brought about convergence at the level of how RIA is performed? As 
shown by Hahn and Litan (2004), European impact assessments are often different from North-
American RIAs. This paper shows that the adoption of a common RIA ‘bottle’ has not produced 
similar European ‘wines’. The language of RIA has produced a community of discourse for 
policy-makers and has stimulated the introduction of some instruments that are similarly labelled 
‘impact assessment’. But RIA practice may exist only on paper, and in some cases the ‘RIA 
label’ may reveal basic assessments of administrative burdens. The paper explains how ideas can 
be diffused without convergence of results. The argument here is not the trivial one that ‘context 
matters’, but how it matters. Hence the paper breaks down ‘context’ into four dimensions, that is, 
institutions, models of the policy process, actors, and legitimacy. Institutional design, the 
capacity to deal with distributional problems, heterogeneity in multi-level governance systems, 
policy styles, and the ‘weights’ given to the preferences of different RIA actors explain the lack 
of convergence.  
   1
What Does Regulatory Impact Assessment Mean in Europe? 
 




With the switch in Europe from economic interventionism to ‘the regulatory state’ and 
the emergence of a regulatory political system in the European Union (EU) (Majone 1996), 
regulatory governance has become a fundamental issue for governments, citizens, and firms. 
Consequently, all EU countries are investing political determination, resources, and institutional 
efforts in programmes and government-wide policy initiatives for ‘better regulation’ and ‘good 
regulatory governance’ (OECD 2002; Mandelkern Report 2001; DG Enterprise 2005).   
Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) is the cornerstone of these programmes, often in 
combination with other tools, such as consultation, simplification, codes of conduct on 
legislative drafting, and initiatives to improve on the access to regulation. It is one of the focal 
points of the EU’s Lisbon-strategy to make Europe the most competitive knowledge-based 
society of the world by 2010. On 26 January 2004, four finance ministers from Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the UK committed four successive EU Presidencies to ‘further 
enhance the quality of impact assessments’ at the EU level and introduce ‘effective systems of 
impact assessment for new legislation and simplification programmes’ at member states level.
1 
On 7 December 2004, a joint statement of six EU Presidencies confirmed the priorities of 
regulatory reform and quality of impact assessment, asking the Commission to measure the 
quality of regulatory tools like impact assessment.
2 
The pivotal position of RIA stems from the fact that it provides standards for the whole 
process of policy formulation, by showing how consultation, the socio-economic costs and 
benefits, and the major trade-offs in policy choice have been taken into account in the assessment 
of regulatory proposals or in the analysis of existing legislation.
3 
The question is: what does the popularity of RIA in Europe really mean? Certainly, 
impact assessment is now an item in the agenda of the EU and its member states. RIA is an 
                                                 
1 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/47C54/jirf_0104.pdf . 
2 See the six Presidencies’ statement at  
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/B39/14/advancing_regulatory_reform_in_europe.pdf .   2
instrument with its own specific characteristics. But in international discourse, the concept of 
better regulation has different meanings. Within this discourse with multiple meanings, RIA is an 
idea whose time has come. The fact that ideas and policy fads travel across the world is well 
known. However, to adopt the same idea does not mean convergence in actual action. A new 
‘bottle’ may contain either old or new wine, or, in cases of symbolic politics even no wine at all. 
As shown by Hahn and Litan (2004) the diffusion of RIA across the two sides of the Atlantic has 
not brought about similarities in the process of policy formulation and the very content of RIA 
still differs markedly. This paper opens up the European box. It shows that although the language 
of impact assessment has produced a community of discourse for policy-makers and has 
stimulated the introduction of some instruments that are labelled ‘impact assessment’ in some 
cases these only exist on paper, and in others disguise different practices under the same label. 
This stands in contrast to the dominant discourse in policy-maker circles – examined in detail by 
Radaelli (2004) - that RIA can be designed (and its quality measured) in a de-contextualised 
manner by using checklists and benchmarking tools.  
How does one explain both the diffusion of the RIA ‘idea’ and lack of convergence of the 
content of impact assessment? The lack of convergence is explained by contextual variables. The 
argument here is not the ‘context matters’ mantra, but how context matters. Hence, ‘context’ is 
broken down into four dimensions, that is, institutions, models of the policy process, actors, and 
legitimacy. By doing so, the paper seeks to provide a bridge between de-contextualised and 
idiosyncratic approaches, by looking at scope conditions under which a constellation of 
contextual variables impact on the content and quality of RIA.  
The next Section makes the point about diffusion and lack of convergence, showing that 
– somewhat paradoxically – it is easier to adopt new policy frameworks than to converge on the 
implementation of policy instruments. The following Section  – informed by institutional 
analysis - explains the lack of convergence in terms of context. The other Sections explore the 
specific dimensions of context, namely institutions, policy processes, the constellation of actors’ 
preferences, and the role played by legitimacy. The final two sections link these dimensions and 
explain why legitimacy and the embeddedness of RIA in the wider process of policy formulation 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 Impact assessment is mostly used ex ante, at the stage of policy formulation, but it can also assist simplification 
programmes and thus can be used ex post.   3
are more important than the quality of economic analysis in impact assessment. This leads to a 
new perspective on the concept of quality of impact assessment. 
 
2. Diffusion Or Convergence? 
 
The diffusion of RIA has been remarkable. So much so that the major agents of diffusion 
(the OECD at the international level, and, for the EU, the informal group of directors of better 
regulation programmes
4 and the ‘High-Level Group on Competitiveness’ within the 
Competitiveness Council)
5 are promoting papers on ‘RIA core aspects (Formez 2004), 
benchmarking exercises, checklists, and indicators based on the assumption that RIA has now 
become a fairly common tool of regulatory governance, the question being one of getting the 
most out of this tool. Thus, the first question to address is about the nature of the process we are 
talking about. In political science, it is common to distinguish between ‘policy diffusion’ (in 
which the analytical focus is on the process of international diffusion of policy ideas and the 
dependent variable is the pattern of adoption of the same policy across countries) and ‘policy 
convergence’ (focused on the effects of diffusion and with similarity or lack of as the dependent 
variable)
6. RIA has gained an important status in the agenda of European governments and the 
EU institutions. It is a case of diffusion. The process of RIA adoption has been supported by the 
diffusion of principles of good regulation. Principles guide the choice of one instrument instead 
of another. 
Let us turn to empirical evidence on diffusion. According to a recent report prepared for 
the Italian, Dutch, and Irish Presidencies of the EU, before 2001 RIA existed only in a few EU 
member states: ‘RIA was almost unknown not only to laymen, but also to most the people 
directly involved in policy formulation and adoption’ (Formez 2004:5). By contrast, in 2004 RIA 
was officially recognised in the large majority of the EU-15, and even in new member states like 
Hungary and Poland (Formez 2004:5). In 2003, a study for the Hellenic Presidency of the EU on 
13 of the then 15 member states (France and Portugal were not included in the sample) reported 
                                                 
4 A better regulation programme (sometimes referred to in the literature as ‘better regulation policy’ or ‘horizontal 
regulatory reform policy’) is a coherent set of tools and initiatives to increase the capacity of governments to deliver 
on high quality regulation.  
5 The apparently simple question on who does what in the EU institutions on better regulation opens up the 
Pandora’s box of several units, task forces, committees, high-level groups, and complex organisation charts. The 
Secretariat General of the European Commission (2004) has produced a detailed map.   4
on the existence of RIA in 7 member states, whilst the other 6 member states had at least pilot 
projects (Hellenic Presidency 2003:8). Thus, all the countries surveyed by the Hellenic 
Presidency’s report claim some experience of RIA.
7  A questionnaire sent in May 2004 to 14 
‘old’ EU member states
8 plus the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, 
and Norway (in the context of a project on indicators of regulatory quality funded by DG 
Enterprise of the Commission) produced the following result: 100 per cent of the 16 respondents 
to a question on the importance of impact assessment in better regulation programmes noted that 
‘the importance of RIA has increased’ (DG Enterprise 2005). 
As mentioned, the adoption of RIA is a component of a wider discourse on better 
regulation. Over the last five years or so, the member states of the EU have engaged in the 
definition of their own principles of better regulation, often drawing on the OECD and North-
American experiences. Principles of better regulation provide the normative basis of discourse. 
The Mandelkern Report (2001) prepared for the EU Laeken Summit of the European Council
9 
presented seven principles of regulatory quality, namely necessity, proportionality, subsidiarity, 
transparency, accountability, accessibility, and simplicity. Three years later, the project on 
indicators of regulatory quality found a pattern of diffusion of these principles (graph1). 
Remarkably, in 2004 all ‘new’ EU member states included in this sample had already established 
principles of regulatory quality. 
Having established that there is a process of diffusion, let us now turn from the dependent 
variable of ‘adoption pattern’ to the very different dependent variable (typical of convergence 
studies) of ‘similarity of effects’. Here the evidence tells another story. RIA pursues different 
goals across the EU. Similarity  at the level of discourse (on principles of regulatory governance 
and ‘better regulation’ rhetoric) and the adoption of some commitments to some type of 
assessment of impacts (variously defined) of proposed regulation should not be confused with 
convergence at the level of use of instruments, not to mention convergence of results (achieved 
via the use of instruments). This is somewhat paradoxical if one considers Peter Hall’s argument 
that major policy ideas and policy paradigms represent the most sophisticated (and most difficult 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 See Knill (2005) for a review of diffusion and convergence. This paper follows his terminology. 
7 France (not included in the sample) adopted RIA on bills and decrees of the Conseil D’Etat in 1998 (circulaire 26 
January 1998). Portugal has a limited form of fiscal analysis. 
8 Portugal not included in the sample.   5
to achieve) type of policy change – instruments and levels of policy instruments being less 
problematic types (Hall 1993). According to Hall, if the whole paradigm upon which policy is 
built has changed, this will produce wide-ranging changes at the level of policy. 
However, in our case, ideas have travelled quite lightly. The fact that a country has a 
formal description of the role of RIA does not necessarily mean that Ministers use RIA in the 
preparation of new legislation. It does not even mean that – when they use it – Ministers broadly 
follow the steps described in box 1 above. Let us look at some more evidence. Firstly, there are 
four clusters of member states in the EU. For some governments impact assessment does not go 
much further than compliance cost assessment; in other member states it does not stretch beyond 
a handful of pilot RIAs; in a third cluster, RIA is merely a check-list process; finally, in a few 
cases (the UK, and the new Commission’s system of integrated impact assessment – see 
European Commission 2002) there appears to be a consistent effort to assess a wide range of 
costs and benefits in an integrated process (source: DG Enterprise 2005, Chapter 7). 
Secondly, only in a minority of EU member states do impact assessments demonstrate 
that the benefit of a proposed regulatory option justify the costs. The UK and Italy fall in this 
category. However, to continue with this example, although the ‘net benefit principle’ features 
both in the UK guide to better regulation and in the Italian law on impact assessment (introduced 
in 1999), rarely does RIA accompany proposals for legislation in the Italian Council of 
Ministers. By contrast, in the UK impact assessment is used routinely in the formulation of 
legislation proposed by the government. 
Thirdly, when asked about the importance of regulatory quality tools in the policy-
making process on a scale from 1 (lowest importance) to 5 (highest importance), RIA was given 
scores of 1 or 2 by no less than three EU member states. Only three of the ‘old’ EU member 
states came up with a 5 score for impact assessment (DG Enterprise 2005). Accordingly, the 
enthusiasm for RIA showed by the EU Presidencies’ statements mentioned above should be 
qualified.  
Fourthly, in a garbage-can fashion, RIA is a solution to different problems. In Germany, 
Sweden, and Italy RIA is perceived as a possible solution to the problem of simplification, in the 
Netherlands it is associated with the issue of competitiveness, in Denmark and Belgium the link 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 The Mandelkern Group was formed by a Resolution of the Ministers of Public Administration at Strasbourg, which 
gave it the ‘mandate to develop a coherent approach to this topic and to submit proposals to the Ministers, including   6
is between RIA and the quality of the business environment. In the EU, RIA is perceived as a 
response to the problem of legitimacy deficit of the Community’s regulatory system (Radaelli 
2004). 
So, having established that the bottle of ‘better regulation discourse’ and RIA is new, 
what type of wine is inside? For the UK and the Commission, we can talk of relatively new wine 
(the UK has been experimenting with RIA since the 1980s) in new bottles. For Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden the wine is the old ‘compliance cost assessment’ and ‘reduction of the 
administrative burdens of enterprises’ re-branded as ‘RIA’. These member states do not place 
major emphasis on the assessment of benefits, especially wide societal benefits. Finally, in some 
member states there is no real use of RIA, no matter what the formal rules for the formulation of 
legislation may say. Italy, France, and Austria – to mention three examples - fall in this category 
of ‘new bottles with no wine inside’.
10 Interestingly, both France and Italy have detailed laws on 
how impact assessment should be done. 
To sum up then, the language of RIA has produced a community of discourse for policy-
makers and has stimulated the introduction of some instruments that are labelled ‘impact 
assessment’ but in some cases exist only on paper, and in other cases disguise different practice 
under the same label. Diffusion at the level of ‘talk’ has not yielded convergence in  ‘actions’ 
and ‘results’ – to use the classic terms suggested by Brunsson (1989) and, more recently, Pollitt 
(2001). Interestingly, no EU government has opposed RIA, for example by arguing that 
Ministers should not be constrained by economic calculations when they make law. In this sense, 
RIA is a hegemonic discourse – everyone wants to have a bottle of this wine at home. But this 
discourse is empirically flawed when it argues (as it often does) that there is a one-size-fits-all 
RIA ‘wine’. It is also conceptually flawed when it tries to make the point that the quality of RIA 
can be measured in a de-contextualised manner – a point we will explore later. Let us now 





                                                                                                                                                             
the definition of a common method of evaluating the quality of regulation’.   7
3. The Role Of Context  
 
Institutional analysis of various types (Weaver and Rockman 1993, Hall and Taylor 
1996) has persuasively demonstrated that context matters – especially in the historical-
institutionalist version (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992). Context matters in processes of 
diffusion and policy transfer because ‘the other conditions are not equal’ (Rose 2002). However, 
this does not mean that only individual explanations can be provided. Rather, it is useful to 
explore scope conditions and avoid the ‘black and white’ tension between idiosyncratic 
explanations and covering laws.
11 If one decides to go beyond the historical institutionalist 
consideration that ‘context matters’, one has to show how it matters. 
Drawing on different theories and models of the policy process, one can formulate the 
following hypotheses. Specifically,  
 
•  Institutional theories (Weaver and Rockman 1993, Hall and Taylor 1996) predict that 
institutional design will shape the behaviour of actors and the use of policy tools. The key 
variables here are institutional complexity and government’s capacity to handle 
distributional conflict. Multi-level regulatory governance (in our case, the fact that 
different levels of governance are involved in RIA) exacerbates distributional conflicts 
and makes it difficult to coordinate ‘better regulation’ across levels. Schmidt (2002) has 
convincingly argued that there are different types of political systems and policy 
processes in the EU. Her distinction about simple and compound polities has implications 
both in terms of how institutions handle conflict and the inclusiveness of processes of 
policy formulation. 
•  In its original approach (OECD 1997), RIA is supposed to work in a rational, orderly 
policy process where problems are defined, alternative solutions are probed, and 
decisions are finally taken by unitary actors. However, theories of the policy process 
(Sabatier 1999) provide a continuum from rational synoptic models to garbage cans 
where solutions, actors, and problems are somewhat independent and constantly 
modified. Richardson (1996) makes the point that EU public policy is closer to garbage 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 With the exception of Italian regional governments. Some Italian regions have successfully experimented with 
RIA in 2002-2004, in the context of a process of devolution under way in this country.   8
cans than to rational-synoptic policy processes. In between the two extremes, one can 
find cases of limited structuration of the policy process - as shown by Lindblom’s 
partisan mutual adjustment (Lindblom 1959; Lindblom and Woodhouse 1963), Sabatier’s 
advocacy coalitions framework (Sabatier 1999: chapter 6), and Kingdon-Zahariadis’ 
multiple streams model (Kingdon 1984; Zahariadis 1999; 2003). 
•  Politico-economic models and pressure group theory (Bernauer and Caduff 2004) suggest 
that different actors (one can dub them ‘RIA stakeholders’) will try to use impact 
assessment for their own goals. Actors have different preferences regarding RIA. For the 
politician, RIA has to deliver in terms of consensus and political rents. For bureaucrats, 
high-quality RIA means respect of formal procedures that define the legitimate activities 
of the civil service. For the citizen, the test of good RIA is its real-world outcome 
(whether it produces regulation that delivers a high level of protection and enables the 
citizen to carry on with socio-economic activities without dissipating the economic and 
environmental resources of the community). For the firm, different approaches 
alternatively stipulate that companies try to secure regulation that protects them from new 
entrants and guarantees rents, or regulation fostering a better business environment. 
•  Finally, the literature on regulatory legitimacy (Majone 1996: chapter 13) suggests that 
the Achilles’ heel of RIA may be legitimacy. When policy tools lack credibility, they 
become at best bureaucratic tick-the-box routines, and at worst they are highly contested. 
RIA legitimacy may also be connected to risk cultures. In some countries, the legitimacy 
of science and rationality makes cost-benefit analysis more acceptable than in countries 
where the culture of risk regulation is not grounded in evidence-based policy.  
 
In consequence, in the remainder of the paper I show how context matters by breaking it 
down into four dimensions. I define them by using the simple labels of ‘institutions’, ‘policy 





                                                                                                                                                             
11 See Olsen (2001) on the role of scope conditions in contemporary political analysis.   9
4. Institutions And Policy Processes 
 
In its original institutional context  – that is the US context – impact assessment is 
produced by independent regulatory agencies monitored by the Office of Management and 
Budget via the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).
12 This is a regulatory 
context characterised by delegation of regulatory powers to non-majoritarian institutions. The 
institutional context is based on sector-level, specialised policy-making. RIA is an instrument for 
discussions at the level of sectoral policy networks (environment, health and safety, food 
regulation, etc.). The legitimacy of the regulatory process is not based on parliamentary control 
over the government but on the credibility of executive agencies. The bureaucratic context is one 
in which agencies and OIRA are well-staffed in terms of professional economists. The dominant 
criterion is efficiency and the main logic is technical. Negotiation and standard operating 
procedures are not absent, but they are not overwhelming. Indeed, when negotiation among 
agencies, regulated firms, and committees in Congress has historically become the dominant 
logic, this has been seen as pathology of the system – and referred to as ‘agency capture’. 
In the EU’s member states, the institutional and bureaucratic contexts are quite different. 
RIA is still a document for technical discussions at the level of sectoral policy networks, but, 
most importantly, it is a communication tool between the government and the parliament, and 
between governments and affected citizens and firms. The ‘regulator’ performing RIA is not an 
independent agency, but a Minister reporting to the executive or the Prime Minister. Most 
independent regulators in Europe have not even been requested to perform impact assessment. 
Only very recently did countries like the UK introduce RIA as a duty of independent economic 
regulators.  
The European bureaucratic context is one characterised by generalist civil servants or 
bureaucrats trained in public law. Efficiency still comes second to formal respect of legitimate 
procedures in the list of criteria used by bureaucracies in countries like France, Germany, and 
Italy. Almost invariably, they ‘read’ RIA in terms of formal (as opposed to substantial) legal 
logic and conformity to other rules and processes. Not only does the logic of negotiation 
dominate the behaviour of Ministers engaged in impact assessment, it also characterises the 
                                                 
12 Hahn and Litan (2004) and Radaelli (2004) provide more information and data on the differences between the US 
and European contexts in which RIA operates.   10
interactions between public administration and pressure groups, and between civil servants and 
politicians (with the Minister, for example, and her-his cabinets).  
The territorial organisation of institutions is also decisive. In the European Union, the 
territorial dimension of RIA is associated to multi-level governance (Sarpi 2003). The more 
distributional problems play an important role, the more RIA becomes political because it goes 
beyond Pareto-efficiency. True, distributional weights can be used to address distributional 
problems in a transparent manner. But the political problems simply shifts to the issue of who 
sets the weights, how, and why should the process be considered legitimate by all stakeholders.  
This is evident at the domestic level. EU member states have different capacities to deal 
with distributional problems, depending on whether they are majoritarian or consociational 
political systems, or, to use Schmidt’s typology, simple or compound democracies (Schmidt 
2002). In simple democracies like the UK, RIA is used by the core executive to coordinate 
policy. As such, it becomes a component of the coordinative discourse on policy choices – to 
follow Schmidt’s terminology. Schmidt has shown that this discourse is relatively ‘thin’ in terms 
of actors and negotiations - hence there are not many distributional problems. The Minister 
draws on RIA to show that the policy choice is being made in the common interest and that the 
benefits justify the costs. Distributional conflicts kick in when RIA enters the communicative 
discourse, that is, the overall broad argumentation used by the government to persuade the 
parliament, the affected interests, and the public opinion.  
In compound democracies like Denmark, coordinate discourse is multi-actor and ‘thick’. 
By contrast, the communicative discourse is ‘thin’. Accordingly, RIA is eminently a tool used by 
socio-economic and governmental elites to define the content of policy. Distributional problems 
are addressed directly at the stage of policy formulation. It is at this stage that the various 
checklists and partial estimates of costs and benefits are used (by civil servants, Ministers, 
economic elites, and unions) to articulate a discourse leading to the formulation of regulatory 
proposals. This is where most of the conflicts arising out of the distributional impact of 
regulation are settled. Accordingly, RIA in compound democracies may not lead to a final 
estimate of costs and benefits for a single preferred option. Instead, different partial estimates are 
available to the stakeholders for the coordination of discourse and negotiation before proposed 
rules are adopted by the government (Radaelli 2004). There is not much evidence of large 
debates on RIA and its distributional effects at the level of communicative discourse. Indeed, the   11
very visibility of impact assessment in the public opinion (for example in the context of debates 
in the quality press on policy reforms under way) is scarce. 
 Let us now move from the domestic level to the EU - a highly compound political 
system. Here distributional conflicts are bound to arise quite frequently. True, distributional 
issues are conceptually the same when one controls for the impact of proposals across England 
(imagine a proposal that penalises a sector concentrated in a county)
13 or the EU. But it is the 
scale of the problem – associated to the existence of various layers of government - which makes 
the EU level peculiar. Most EU proposals for regulation penalise some sectors, or some types of 
firms, and advantage others. Certain sectors or certain types of firms are statistically more 
represented in some member states than in others. This is why some governments like the UK 
have specific guidelines on how a government should monitor the evolution of EU proposals 
(and thus monitor EU RIA) via domestic assessments.
14  
The question is what criteria and logic should be used in this process? If a country like, 
say, France, predicts (via a French RIA) concentrated losses for key French sectors arising out of 
a proposed EU regulation still at the stage of impact assessment, what is the best way to insert 
this aspect into the design of EU-level RIA? What happens to be boundaries between technical 
and political logic in this situation?  
The EU coordinative discourse on policy formulation goes beyond the Commission. It 
involves the European Parliament and the Council as well. Accordingly, the Council, the 
European Parliament and the Commission have agreed on an institutional agreement on better 
law-making to make RIA a common priority across institutions (EP- Council-Commission 
2003). Yet the question of how to manage distributional conflict in the EU-level RIA is there to 
stay. As shown by Majone (1996), the whole EU political system (not just its regulatory process) 
is ill equipped to handle distributional problems. The early experience with the new integrated 
impact assessment introduced in 2002 by the Commission shows that RIA can be, unfortunately, 
an ideal tool to disguise political-distributional problems under the veil of pseudo-
methodological problems.
15  
                                                 
13 Scottish draft legislation is checked via Scottish RIAs. 
14 See the ‘European regulation’ checklist on the website of the cabinet office http://www.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/regulation/Europe/eurodocs/EuroChecklist.pdf. 
15 This argument draws on meetings with policy officers at the Commission and in member states in the context of 
the preparation of the first pan-European conference on impact assessment, Brussels, 3 December 2003, see   12
When methodological issues are genuine, they present their own hurdles. Look at the 
discount rate. One can guess that the Estonian or German discount rate on environmental ‘EU 
public goods’ can be very different from the British rate. This is due to the well-known fact that 
Estonian and German citizens have different preferences regarding the environment than the 
British citizens. How does one take this into account in the formulation of a EU RIA? What is 
the average discount rate? Shall one look at medium EU values weighted by population? The 
problem applies to several hedonic prices and to the other important issues, such as the value of 
life (Viscusi and Aldi 2003). 
Institutions provide the riverbeds for policy processes – our second dimension of 
context.
16 What type of policy process is implicit in RIA programmes around the EU? As 
originally formulated (OECD 1997), impact assessment is contingent on an orderly policy 
process with unitary actor and limited information gaps – a model close to the pole of rational-
synoptic policy-making mentioned above. In this model, policy decisions are based on the 
systematic use of empirical evidence. The quality of RIA is measured in terms of the quality of 
the economic analysis contained therein. 
The rational-synoptic model breaks down under conditions of bounded rationality and 
policy controversies where actors conflict over problem definition and filter the same evidence 
by using radically different cognitive ‘frames’. Additionally, to draw systematically on empirical 
evidence provided by impact assessment may be almost impossible in garbage-can policy 
processes where problems are constantly re-formulated by different political actors, solutions are 
changed frequently, and the competences of different departments are re-shuffled or unclear.  
Especially in compound democracies, the regulatory process is highly fragmented, with multiple 
points of contact between politics and administration, and between different logics and criteria.  
Yet one cannot run the risk of simply throwing the baby away with the bath water and 
concluding that RIA is useless because politics always trumps technical criteria. RIA can be 
useful even in processes that do not come closer to the rational-synoptic ideal. RIA can be used 
by endogeneising bounded rationality and the politics-administration continuum (as opposed to a 
model of radical separation of politics and administration). One possible way to re-frame impact 
assessment within a more realistic theory of the European policy process is to cast RIA in terms 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/regulation/better_regulation/impact_assessment/ia_conference.htm. On the 
early experience with EU-level RIA see Vibert (2003).   13
of Bayesian learning. Let me spend a few words on this. The starting point is that all policies are 
collection of hypotheses about causal relationships: if the government does X, the economy and 
society will react by doing Y and we will reach the goal Z. RIA is an ex-ante exercise, hence 
based on hypotheses formulated under conditions of uncertainty. In turn, uncertainty is of a 
subjective nature rather than being the frequency of observed events. In most cases of impact 
assessment, regulators would formulate subjective probabilities, as the events they are dealing 
with cannot be observed several times under the same experimental conditions. 
One obvious way to reduce errors contained in hypotheses about reality is to make use of 
experience. Bayesian learning provides a methodology to learn from experience under conditions 
of uncertainty by using simple rules of coherence (Parmigiani 2002). Policy makers attribute 
subjective prior probabilities to events and then use experience to up-date their probabilities in a 
coherent way. Posterior probabilities are therefore informed by experience. A fundamental 
theorem in Bayesian statistics states that when experience becomes considerable - and provided 
that actors use coherence in adapting their prior probabilities - the value of initial attributions of 
probability to events (that is, prior probabilities) does not matter much - except in extreme cases 
when an individual attributes either zero or one probability to an event. Posterior probabilities 
converge when experience grows. RIA can therefore be seen as a tool providing evidence and 
rules through which regulators learn coherently. Bayesian learning can supply a model in which 
different subjective opinions about uncertain events can be accommodated, provided that all 
actors (the expert, the bureaucrat, and the politician) accept to learn from evidence - by following 
certain rules of the game. Needless to say, there is no explicit consideration of the policy process 
in current discussion, and no approach along Bayesian lines has been presented so far.  
 
5. RIA For Whom?  
 
The presence of different actors, logics, and criteria has been already mentioned in the 
previous Sections. This Section looks at RIA actors more closely. Drawing on a classic study of 
decision-making in international politics, Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision (1971), Farrow 
and Copeland (2003) argue that ‘RIA quality’ can be interpreted in three different (yet not 
mutually exclusive) ways. They argue that there are at least three RIA ‘stakeholders’ (political 
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scientists would prefer to stick to ‘actors’), i.e., the ‘expert’, the ‘civil servant’, and the 
‘politician’. It is useful to add a fourth important actor, the ‘citizen’. And, finally, a fifth 
important ideal-typical actor is the ‘corporate actor’ (the firm at the micro level and business 
organisations at a more aggregate level). 
Different actors bring into RIA diverse logics, criteria, and quality assurance 
mechanisms. More fundamentally, better regulation programmes around the EU ‘weigh’ actors’ 
preferences differently. The weighing is implicit, as there is no discussion of the key assumptions 
about actors in the ‘better regulation discourse’ throughout Europe. Yet one may legitimately ask 
the question whether these programmes are based on the assumption that politicians are rent-
seeking - hence RIA should target this problem and empower Weberian civil servants? Or do 
they make the assumption that policy-makers regulate in the public interest, for example because 
they want to be re-elected and good quality regulation may increase their popularity? To what 
extent do the preferences of independent agencies differ from the preferences of elected officials 
and with what impact on the efficiency and credibility of impact assessment? 
The literature on the political economy of regulation is vast. One result is that although 
elected regulators respond to pressure groups and re-election incentives, they are also be driven 
by their own ideological preferences (Kalt and Zupan 1984). Turning to agencies, in an analysis 
of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) decisions, Cropper et al. (1992) show that regulators 
take into account both private interests and diffuse interests (such as the general welfare of the 
community) when they set environmental standards.  
These results come with several qualifications, but the empirical and theoretical literature 
on how to model actors’ preferences should be the starting point of any meaningful RIA system. 
Without a model that specifies the preferences of policy-makers (be they politicians or civil 
servants) it is impossible to say what RIA should do. A ‘good RIA design’ means different 
things depending on whether one makes the assumption that civil servants have a preference for 
regulatory expansion, or are captured by powerful pressure groups, or regulate in the public 
interest. 
Other questions arise from the firms’ models in regulatory policy. What do corporate 
actors want from regulation? Do they seek efficiency or protection? Indeed, the literature 
suggests very different approaches to the preferences of firms: 
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•  In the public interest theory of regulation, regulators provide rules for the common good 
and therefore firms should not be necessarily hostile to regulation. One may expect that 
regulators acting for the common good care about quality and that regulatory efficiency is 
a component of this.  
•  In private interest theory (or positive political economy), however, firms seek regulation 
as a shelter from competition and new entrants. They try to capture regulators and secure 
protection. The implication is that dominant companies in a sector would prefer ‘low 
quality’, inefficient regulation. A classic paper by Buchanan and Tullock (1975) shows 
that companies prefer inefficient direct regulation to cost-effective instruments such as 
environmental taxes because quotas that restrict entry to a market originate scarcity rents.  
•  In some modern forms of regulatory theories, high levels of environmental and health and 
safety protection can be a comparative advantage in open markets. Firms may form 
coalitions with green groups and advocate for high levels of protection (Vogel 1995; 
Genschel and Plümper 1997). Using different arguments, Porter (1990) argues that 
regulation can stimulate innovation and produce competitiveness. One should therefore 
expect that competitive firms support this type of regulation, whereas marginal firms 
object to it. 
•  Finally, another strand of regulatory analysis, this time more focused on empirical 
studies, has reached the conclusion that regulation has no major influence on the 
competitiveness of a country, and in any case the locational choices of companies are not 
systematically influenced by the presence or absence of high labour and environmental 
standards (Jaffe et al. 1995). This conclusion has been attacked by those who claim that 
‘good regulatory governance matters’ in terms of productivity, better regulatory 
environment, and ultimately growth (Kaufmann et al. 2003). 
 
The problem is compounded by the fact that firms differ in size, sector, and exposure to 
international trade. Recent models of the firm in regulatory policy break down the notion of the 
corporate sector as unitary actor and show how different companies join different coalitions in 
the regulatory game (Bernauer and Caduff 2004). 
The choice of one model of actor or another makes a large difference. The discussion is 
not exclusively academic. It has clear policy implications. The early RIA approach of the UK (a   16
programme for compliance cost assessment introduced by the Conservative governments in the 
1980s) was based on the assumptions that regulatory reform is the solution to the problem of 
excessive bureaucratic power, that firms are too often excluded from the regulatory process and 
do not seek protectionist rules, and that policy-makers do not regulate in the public interest, but 
in the interest of bureaucratic expansion. By contrast, in the 1990s, RIA in the Netherlands was 
the solution to the problem of a regulatory process dominated by ‘corporatist triangles’ (of 
policy-makers, employers’ organisations, and unions). The assumptions were that the regulatory 
process was not open enough to diffuse interests, that policy-makes tended to coalesce with 
powerful pressure groups to the detriment of the public interest, and that without a deliberate 
effort to open up the process (via consultation and impact assessment) the formulation of 
regulations would become an opaque, unaccountable process. 
The result is that one has to clarify the issue ‘RIA for whom’ before one can design RIA 
and measure its quality with indicators and benchmarking tools. Overall, the notion of ‘good 
RIA’ means different things to different stakeholders. Moreover, the criteria used to evaluate 
success differ markedly (Table 1). Let us illustrate this with a simple five-actor approach. 
Imagine that one can settle the issue of the models of actors by deciding that experts are neutral 
and rational actors, bureaucrats are all Weberian civil servants, politicians are best-described by 
public choice theory, citizens are attentive and want to participate, and the firm’s utility function 
does not deviate too much from the neo-classical model (this means that profit maximisation is 
the overriding goal, but we do not say whether firms want to reach it via protectionist regulation 
or via the reduction of red tape). 
Drawing on models of actors in the policy process (Sabatier 1999) and bearing in mind 
we are speaking of ideal-types, one can reason that: 
 
•  The economist (the classic ‘expert’ in RIA programmes) is concerned about efficiency. 
•  Civil servants approach RIA by following proper and legitimate procedures in the 
regulatory process. This actor will use conformity to rules as the main criterion. 
•  For the politician, RIA may well mean responsiveness to pressure groups, or the median 
voter, or even responsiveness to external pressure created by the EU, the International 
Monetary Fund, and so on. Let us assume that the politician uses consensus as the main 
criterion and success is evaluated in terms of the outcome of negotiations.   17
•  The firm perceives the opportunities of RIA in terms of minimisation of costs and defines 
success in terms of profit. 
•  The citizens use yet another criterion, the effective protection from risk. 
 
The criteria to establish whether RIA is good or bad vary considerably. They are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, though. Regulation produced via proper and legitimate 
procedures can result in efficient and fair regulation. But one cannot establish a sort of 
mechanical equivalence of every criterion used by different stakeholders. The idea that RIA 
should be approached and evaluated only in terms of the quality of its economic analysis is based 
on institutions and policy processes that give a weight of 100 per cent to one actor, that is, the 
expert. This looks more like a technocratic dystopia than a realistic description of how actors’ 
preferences are weighted by real-world better regulation programmes. 
The logic of action is also different. The civil servant follows the logic of standard 
operating procedures, the politician uses negotiation, and the expert draws on the logic of the 
social sciences. The citizen’s behaviour, instead, is informed by the logic of participation. 
Finally, the firm draws on the logic of influence.  
In real-world regulatory policy processes, the diverse criteria and logics interact 
continuously. The expert, the politician, the civil servant, the citizen, and the corporate actor are 
ideal-types. Real-world RIA programmes show women and men who share some of the 
characteristics of the expert, some features of the classic Weberian public officer, and also take 
into account political considerations. Take the case of the European Commission. Its political 
role in the EU policy process is clearly stated in the Treaties. The Commission’s logic cannot be 
confined to that of the classic Weberian officer. It is the logic of a political body with its own 
political agenda –a body which also shares some of the characteristics of the ‘expert’ and, of 
course, the ‘classic civil servant’. Ideal types are useful because they show how criteria and 
logics interact all the time, and how different groups of ideal-typical actors provide radically 
different contexts for impact assessment. They also show that the issue of measuring RIA quality 
is more problematic than the EU Presidencies think, and that indicators of quality should be 
designed carefully. 
Depending on the constellation of logics and criteria, and on the stakeholders in charge of 
the policy process, RIA programmes go in different directions and pursue different goals. In a   18
context where the logic of formal respect of procedures predominates, RIA is performed by 
governmental departments to show how the various steps in policy formulation were handled. If 
the context is also one of administrative cooperation, RIA is also shaped by inter-administrative 
cooperation. It is a tool that enables different departments to manage cooperation (this is to some 
extent the case of Denmark, the Netherlands, and, with variable success so far, the European 
Commission). Contrast this with the UK, where the cabinet office is in charge of RIA and 
communicates directly with departments about the content of impact assessment. In this case the 
logic is more ‘vertical’ than ‘horizontal’.  
Beyond public administration, the real issue is about policy styles and their persistence 
(Unger and van Waarden 1995). As mentioned, a prevailing corporatist style has shaped RIA in 
countries, where RIA is used by policy-makers in a ‘governance mode’ that is more ‘negotiation’ 
than ‘technical analysis of options’.  
 
6. Regulatory Legitimacy 
 
The final dimension of context is legitimacy. As averred, there are different criteria used 
by different actors to approach and evaluate RIA. This is acknowledged by the Communication 
of the Commission on impact assessment (2002). The Commission argues that the main goal of 
RIA is to describe and measure the great trade-offs behind a regulatory choice.
17 Accurate 
analysis is obviously a cornerstone for the credibility of RIA, but it should present the decision-
makers with some important issues they have to address – rather than pretending that impact 
analysis ‘silences’ the debate by providing a ‘scientific’ solution to political problems. 
If questions are at least as important as answers, then legitimacy is a strong criterion to 
evaluate RIA. Cross-national experience (early UK experience of compliance cost assessment, 
France and Germany in the 1990s) shows that when RIA is built around only one support 
constituency (such as the business community) the problems of legitimacy become 
insurmountable. The Italian case (La Spina 2002) is another example of legitimacy problems. 
RIA was introduced in this country under pressure from the OECD by a small group of policy 
advisors and a motivated Minister. This looks like a case of RIA construction around an 
                                                 
17 The project funded by DG Enterprise (2004) came to the conclusion that the identification via RIA of ‘one option 
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embryonic epistemic community supported by an entrepreneurial Minister. But neither the Italian 
business community, nor the civil society were really interested in this new tool. The result was 
the momentum for RIA was lost. Currently, the EU Council is discussing the option of focusing 
better regulation initiatives by using targets of reduction of administrative burdens of firms. This 
would be yet another case of a narrow answer to the question ‘RIA for whom?’ and would 
provide little legitimacy to EU-level impact assessment. 
New policy instruments necessitate a robust network of actors. The latter does not 
necessarily produce legitimacy, but it is a necessary condition. Different actors may have 
different views on the quality of RIA performed by institutions, but the sheer fact that they raise 
issues, make points, push for higher standards is a fundamental catalyst of policy improvement. 
By contrast, tools that interest only policy officers tend to float in a sort of limbo and eventually 
become useless. In this connection, one should look favourably at the development of networks 
of academics and private sector think-tanks that challenge the government’s numbers. By doing 
so, they perform a sort of ‘extended peer review’ and quality control of what institutions do.  
These points on legitimacy shed a different light on what is a ‘good RIA’. The current 
hegemonic discourse in RIA policy circles has emphasised the importance of good economic 
analysis. But legitimacy is even more important. It leads to a definition of ‘good RIA’ (and 
consequently to a benchmark for its evaluation) based on embeddedness. A ‘good RIA’ is above 
all embedded in the wider regulatory policy process. As argued by DG Enterprise’s project:  
‘In a sense, even if impact assessment is impeccable in terms of economic analysis, this is 
not a sufficient condition for quality. The latter is achieved when better regulation tools change 
the way regulators think about public policy, inform ministerial decisions, and conversely, when 
they change the way organized interests, firms and citizens engage in the policy-making process, 
understand and accept the regulatory framework’ (DG Enterprise 2005: 5) 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
Although a community of discourse has emerged around better regulation programmes 
and RIA, impact assessment differs markedly throughout the EU. The problem is how to explain 
the rise of a common discourse and principles of better regulation, the spread of RIA across 
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Europe, and divergence of content. One common argument in the historical institutionalist 
literature is that context matters. This paper has made an effort to show how it matters. Four 
elements of context are decisive in the diffusion of RIA. The contextual elements to control for 
are institutions, policy process, actors, and legitimacy. 
For a start, there are multiple approaches to RIA. Different definitions, criteria, and logics 
can be related one to another, but they often differ. The balance of different actors’ preferences, 
the persistence of policy styles, and implicit models of the policy process steer better regulation 
and RIA in various directions. The result is lack of convergence. 
Institutions are the riverbeds in which regulatory processes flow. US and European 
riverbeds are quite different.  Within the EU there are several institutional models. EU multi-
level governance and EU institutional heterogeneity bring their own sets of challenges. Further, 
RIA is not a tool operating in vacuum. It is situated in an often-implicit theory of the policy 
process. In some cases RIA has been imported in EU countries with largely unrealistic models of 
the policy process. The result has been ‘new bottles with bad wine, or no wine at all’. 
The point about legitimacy brings us to argue that the plurality of voices and actors in 
RIA is a pre-condition for regulatory legitimacy. Arguably, the lesson to learn about the 
diffusion of impact assessment is that legitimacy is much more important than efficiency. The 
two are intertwined, of course, as an efficient RIA is more credible than wrong economic 
analysis of regulatory proposals. But the point is that credibility is the Achilles’ heel of impact 
assessment. RIA actors are interested in how their views are incorporated in the regulatory 
process, how science is validated and by whom, and how the government produces its own 
numbers. When they are not persuaded and think that RIA is tilted towards one actor’s 
preferences to the detriment of others, there is no economic analysis that can compensate for the 
credibility deficit. If RIA is there to ‘make institutions think’
18 (and not to make only some 
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Table 1 - How different stakeholders look at RIA 
 

































































Graph 1: Principles of regulatory quality  














































































































Source: DG Enterprise, Indicators of Regulatory Quality, 2005. Data collected in May 2004. 
 